Department: Public Administration
No of Pages: 130
Project Code: PA1
References: Yes
Cost: 5,000XAF Cameroonian
: $15 for International students
ABSTRACT
Since the inception of the policy of
decentralization in Cameroon, there have been accusations and counterarguments from political and opinion leaders who claim that the policy will remain a
nightmare in a centralized state as Cameroon.
A major
dimension of this problem is the fact that ethnic, linguistic and political
differences continue to widen the gap between regions. The study seeks to
examine the extent to which decentralization provides an efficient service
delivery in Limbe II municipality.
The study
makes use of the social capital theory and the New Public Administration
theory. The target population for the study is the entire population of Limbe
II municipality as well as Limbe II council staffs and other local authorities.
Both
qualitative and quantitative data were used in this study. For qualitative
data, interviews were conducted with local authorities in Limbe II who were
purposely selected because of their knowledge on decentralisation as well as
their experiences in public service.
Also,
quantitative data was collected using questionnaires which were administered
randomly to individuals in Limbe II municipality. This was to get their
perceptions about decentralisation and service delivery in their locality.
Results from
this study show that decentralisation affects the efficient and effective
delivery of services in Limbe II. Finally the study recommends that government
of Cameroon adopts “true decentralization”.
What is
presently in practice according to popular opinions is not “true
decentralization”. The government of Cameroon should give the local councils
full autonomy to handle their own affairs and finances. With this they will be
able to provide better services to the people.
1.1 Background to the
Study
In the last
quarter century, over 75 countries have attempted to transfer responsibilities
of the state to lower tiers of government. Significantly, most of these
lower-tier governments have been elected, so that the decentralization is not
just administrative or fiscal, but also political.
The motivation for the decentralization has varied. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was part of the political and economic transformation; in Latin America, it was to reinforce the transition to democracy;
in South
Africa, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, it was a response to ethnic or regional
conflict; and in Chile, Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire, it was to improve the
delivery of basic services (Shah and Thompson 2004:2).
Even when it
is not explicit, improving service delivery is an implicit motivation behind
most of these decentralization efforts.
The reasons
are twofold. First, these basic services, such as health, education, water and
sanitation, all of which are the responsibility of the state, are
systematically failing and especially failing poor people (World Bank 2003:38).
That
governments are falling short of their responsibility to ensure adequate
health, education, water and sanitation to their people can be seen at various
levels. At the macroeconomic level, the main instrument with which governments
exercise this responsibility, public spending seems to have only a weak
relationship with outcomes.
Public
spending on health has no significant association with reductions in child or
infant mortality; and public spending on education has an extremely weak
relationship with primary school completion rates (Hammer and Pritchett
2000:243).
A look at
the microeconomic evidence indicates why government spending does not translate
to better outcomes. For one thing, the money does not often reach the frontline
service provider. In Uganda, the share of non-salary spending on primary
education that actually reached primary schools was 13 percent (Reinikka and
Svensson 2001:13).
For another,
the quality of these services is often extremely poor. In Bangladesh, the
absenteeism rate for doctors in primary health centres was 74 percent
(Chaudhury and Hammer 2003:9).
The second
reason why improving service delivery is behind most decentralization efforts
is that these services are consumed locally. Historically, they were also
provided locally. Norway’s health system was run by locally-appointed health
commissions until the 1930s; schools in Nepal were managed by communities until
the 1960s.
Yet today
the central government in these two countries (as well as most others) assumes
responsibility for the delivery of these services. Many governments and their
electorates associate the problems of service delivery with the centralization
of these services.
For
instance, the fact that only a fraction of the money that is due service
providers actually reaches them may be due to the power of the central
government vis-Ã -vis local government, through whom the money gets transferred.
Similarly,
centralization means that the allocation of resources among these local
services may not reflect local preferences. Faguet (2001:13) shows that
decentralization in Bolivia led to a better match between local preferences and
budgetary allocations.
Faguet’s
study points to another problem of centralization: some regions might get
completely neglected. Prior to decentralization in Bolivia, an overwhelmingly
disproportionate amount of public resources were concentrated in the capital
city and its surroundings.
Finally,
central-government provision could also lead to greater corruption and misuse
of funds, as the service recipients in a local district cannot monitor the
bureaucrat or politician in thecapital city (Bardhan and Mukherjee 2000:78).
However,
despite these problems associated with central delivery of services, the
experience with decentralization has been quite mixed (World Bank 2003:57;
Burki, Perry, and Dillinger 1999:346). While success or failure is difficult
(and premature) to judge, some common problems associated with
decentralization’s impact on service delivery have begun to emerge.
The most frequently-cited
problem is the lack of capacity at sub-national levels of government to
exercise responsibility for public services. In Uganda and Tanzania, the lower
tiers of government lacked the ability to manage public finances and maintain
proper accounting procedures.
Since these were a requirement for transferring money to the lower tiers, they actually received less money than before decentralization. In Uganda, spending on primary health care fell from 33 percent to 16 percent during decentralization (Akin, Hutchinson, and.
In Ethiopia, where decentralization goes down to the
third tier or woreda level, some woredas lack enough people who can read and
write to operate the district governments Strump 2001:34).
A second
problem is that decentralization has led to misaligned responsibilities,
possibly because the process is incomplete, possibly for political reasons.
Although Pakistan has devolved responsibility for education to the districts,
school teachers remain employees of the provincial government.
The district
nazim or elected executive has little authority over the hiring, firing,
evaluation, or placement of teachers.
Third, while
decentralization was in some cases intended to strengthen the political power
of lower tiers of government vis-Ã -vis the center, it has also increased the
possibility of political capture within these lower tiers.
In 1979,
Indonesia established “village governments” with locally-chosen village heads
accountable to village councils that would determine budget priorities. A study
of 48 rural villages showed that, since village heads chose the members of the
council, accountability to the villagers was weak; only 3 percent of the
village proposals were included in the district budgets.
Those
villagers who participated in government organizations were more likely to
speak out at village council meetings, crowding out the voice of others in the
village (World Bank 2001:2).
Fourth, a
host of other problems, not associated with service delivery, have nevertheless
helped to undermine service delivery in decentralizing economies.
For
instance, the “soft-budget constraint” facing sub-national governments has led
to over-borrowing (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003:23) and, in the case of
Argentina, a major macroeconomic crisis at the end of 2001.
The social
impact of the Argentinian crisis has clearly been a deterioration in service
quality: poverty rates jumped 40 percent, 12 percent of the people with formal
health insurance discontinued their policies, medical supplies were in short
supply throughout the public hospital network and in 2002 a third of the
provinces experienced school closings of 20-80 days out of a 180-day school
year (World Bank 2003:5).
The history
of decentralization in Cameroon cannot overlook the country’s triple heritage
which is tied to its colonial past, its journey through independence and
unification; leading up to the country’s various major efforts at governance.
According to
V. Lemiux (2001:24) ‘Decentralization policies just like other public policies
account for games of power among the various actors involved.’ The third and
current constitution of Cameroon (Part I article 2) establishes Cameroon as a
‘decentralized unitary state’.
It further
establishes that ‘Decentralization shall consist of devolution by the state of
special powers and appropriate resources to local authorities. And, ‘it shall constitute the basic driving force for promotion of
development, democracy and good governance at the local level.’ (Section 5:
Article 1& II).
Lemieux
concludes that case studies in different countries prove well, that
decentralization is predominantly about policies of deconcentration,
delegation, devolution of power or privatization policies.
However,
Karl Weick is more moderate in his prescription, when he opinionates that ‘The real trick in
highly reliable systems is somehow to achieve simultaneous centralization and
decentralization’.
Decentralization
in Cameroon has had a long trajectory. It is woven into numerous efforts to
progressively meet with the popular expectations of the various populations.
These expectations are as diverse as Cameroon by its very nature of
geographical and cultural composition, further muddled with the country’s
historical complexities.
To D. Abwa
(Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013:77), ‘Cameroon can be singled out as a
country with a succession of changed status. It was a German protectorate
(1884-1916), a French and British colony (1916-1919, a territory under SDN
mandate (1919-1945) a territory under UN supervision (1946-1960).
After
Britain and France shared it during the First World War, the population of
Cameroon partially succeeded to reconstitute the entity at the epoque, as a
Federal Republic in 1961, 1st October.
This
changed/changing status which constitute part and parcel of the evolution of
Cameroon as a state, substantially reflect and account for the complexities
around its decentralization process.
Cameroon’s
long and complex history of subjugation to colonial rule, having been
administered by Germany, France, and Britain, further experienced another wave
of ‘internal’ transition in its post-independence era. This adds to another
phase in the country’s history of governance, with which it continuous to
grapple.
To Caldwell,
(2017:90), ‘ Another phase of Cameroon’s history of reunification can be traced
through the October 1, 1961 United Nations supervised plebiscite which first
led to the creation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in a two -state
federation;
West
Cameroon and East Cameroon, with English and French languages having equal
status. In 1972, the first president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon,
AhmadouAhidjo (1960-1982), called for a referendum in which the Federal
Republic of Cameroon was again changed to the United Republic of Cameroon.
Unfortunately,
the unification between French speaking Cameroon and Southern Cameroon was
inadequate for both parts to efficiently recognize a dual cultural heritage and
was void of equal administration.
Instead, the
unification was a trajectory for the Anglophones to be involved in another
phase of assimilation and/or imperialism from French speaking Cameroon. Because
the French speaking part of the country dominated power, the minority
Anglophone territory remained marginalized’.
The
situation does not seem to have evolved very favourably thereafter. According
to Anyangwe, (2018:47) French Cameroon
held Southern Cameroons forcibly under the guise of the referendum (p.2).
The
superficial peace and unity which was presumably in the Republic of Cameroon,
that is both British and French speaking Cameroon which existed from 1961, has
turned into a political and social instability since 2016 as Anglophone armed
groups have taken up weapons fighting to secede from French Cameroon.
A major
grievance includes marginalization of the Anglophone cultural, educational, and
legal systems by the Francophone dominated central government. British Southern Cameroon consists of two
regions (provinces), in a country of ten regions.
Anglophone
Cameroonians feel they are neglected because they are not adequately
represented in the government (Caldwell, 2017:60). The feelings of neglect of the Anglophone
regions by the Francophone-dominated government morphed into a civil war in
2017 following months of riots.
Cameroon’s
President Paul Biya, called for a Major National Dialogue from September
30-October 4, 2019. As outcome of the dialogue, the president ordered for a
discontinuance of all pending cases in military courts involving individuals
arrested from the Anglophone regions in connection with the strikes against the
government.
In addition,
the President freed 333 people who were in military custody on account of the
Anglophone problem in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. Also,
the president granted a “special status” to the Anglophones.
This was
intended to secure some level of autonomy to the two Anglophone regions in
recognition of their historical, social and economic specification. According to Kindzeka (2019:13), the central
government still maintains strong control over the economic and political life
of the regions.
As such, the
“special status” was not received with enthusiasm by the secessionists and was
regarded as not efficient. This is because the “special status” consists only
of the creation of a House of Chiefs, regional councils and regional assemblies
for Southern Cameroons.
However, the
“special status” does not give these institutions power to implement laws. Instead, deliberations from these bodies will
be sent to the National Assembly with an overwhelming francophone majority for
legislative decisions. As such, Anglophone Cameroonian lawmakers were only
granted deliberative powers (Kindzeka, 2019:12).
Attempts to
monitor the efficiency of local government structures in the provision of
services only gained prominence in Cameroon from June 2000 when the report on a
national program to monitor the gradual implementation of the reform to
decentralized institutions in order to promote democracy and grassroots
development was presented (Ewumbue 2001:64).
Reports highlighted the need to decentralize
units, dissolve powers to local entities and the need for effective transfer of
powers. From this report, a national policy on decentralization was adopted in
2000.
The extent
to which these policy documents, coupled with local government performance
measurement tools have helped improve the performance of councils in Cameroon
in service provision is what this study intends to investigate
According to
part 10(Article 55) of the 18th January 1996 Cameroon constitution,
it emphasizes on the aspect of decentralization by legalizing the creation of
local councils and brings out their functions. It also spells out their
jurisdictions and grants them autonomy that is power to make rules governing
the municipality under the supervision of the central government.
It is worth
nothing that Article 55 (2) state clearly that “regional and local authorities
shall be public law corporate bodies. They shall have administrative and
financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests.
They shall
be freely administered by councils elected under conditions laid down by law.
The duty of the regional and local authorities shall be to promote the
economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of the
said authority.”
In 2004, the
State of Cameroon embarked on the process of decentralization which entails
transferring some competences to the local government or council for proper
management.
Since the
inception of this policy, there have been accusations and counter arguments
from political and opinion leaders who claim that the policy will remain a
nightmare in a centralized state as Cameroon.
This
explains why recently, some political leaders and other opinion holders have
been clamouring for a change of the form of the State with many asking for the
return to the federal system of government which was practiced in 1961.
Recently,
following the recommendations of the Major National Dialogue which was aimed at
resolving the Anglophone crisis; it completely ignored the main proposal which
was the form of state, suggested
by many groups/persons that were consulted prior to the dialogue.
This shows
that the dialogue had a prepared agenda and result as it failed to meet the
aspirations of the two affected regions. The main recommendation which is still
hoped to be implemented by the government is the granting of “special status”to both regions as
stipulated in Article 62 of the 1996 Cameroon constitution.
The form of
state was prohibited on the dialogue table, while the government emphasized on
the continuity of its 23 years old decentralization policy which so far has
yielded less than half the percentage of its expectations (Enowbachem Agbor, 2019:1).
1.2 Statement of the problem
One of the most outstanding defects of Cameroon as a post-colonial African state is its lack of genuine decentralisation policies. A major dimension of this problem is the fact that ethnic, linguistic and political differences continue to widen the gap between regions.
Ethnic conflicts and feelings of superiority of some
cultures over others have exacerbated the problem.
This is
evidenced by the fact that service delivery in Cameroon, such as street
lightening, public toilets and maintenance of streets, motor parks, and public
taps has not been afforded constitutional status.
- Looking at the Cameroon constitution of January
18th 1996, article 55 (2) which states that the regional and
local authorities shall have administrative and financial autonomy and
shall be freely administered by elected councils, but the problem is; does
the local government have autonomy.
- According to article 58 (1) (2) which states that
city mayors shall represent the state in regions, they shall be
responsible for national interests, administrative control, ensuring
compliance with laws and regulations as well as maintaining law and order.
They shall under the authority of the government supervise and coordinate
state activities in the region.
Decentralisation
as a strategy was introduced in Cameroon in an attempt to solve the problem in
the two English speaking regions of Cameroon as it involves the transfer of powers
from the central government to local governments.
It implies
the local government manage their resources and budget by themselves. Foquet
(2014:12) also noted that, African countries took deliberate initiatives to
reform their Public services with a key agenda of improving service delivery to
the citizens through decentralising roles and responsibilities to Local
Government Authorities.
Yet, despite
these policy reform initiatives, contrasting outcomes of decentralisation are
being witnessed between and within countries, with marked divergence in
anticipated outcomes related to public services.
Several
studies underscore the positive impact of decentralisation (Faguet, 2012:14)
while others show its detrimental effect (Treisman, 2006:243) and even some
show no effect at all (Khaleghian, 2003:512) or mixed evidence (Smith
&Revell, 2016:213).
The question
here is that, has decentralisation been efficient in service delivery in Limb
II municipality. It is for this reason that this study seeks to investigate
decentralisation as an efficient mechanism for service delivery in Cameroon,
the case of Limbe II municipality in the southwest region of Cameroon.
The study
seeks to examine the extent to which decentralisation provides an efficient
service delivery in Limbe II municipality
1.3.1 Specific Research Questions of the Study
The
following are specific research questions of this study
- To what
extent does the application of decentralisation relate to efficient service
delivery in Limbe II municipality
- What is
the perception of end users of health and social service delivery in the
context of decentralisation in Limbe II municipality?
- What
are the challenges faced by local authorities in effective service
delivery in Limbe II municipality?
1.4 Main Research Objective
The main
objective of this study is to establish a relationship between the
decentralisation process of the country and the efficient provision of services
in the Limbe II municipality.
1.4.1 Specific Objectives of the Study
The specific
objectives of the study are to:
- Examine
the link between the application of decentralisation and efficient service
delivery in the Limbe II municipality
- Assess
the perception of end users of health and social service delivery in the
context of decentralisation in Limbe II municipality
- Evaluate
the challenges faced by local authorities in effective service delivery in
Limbe II municipality
